Abstract: We analyse the security and performance of a continuous variable quantum key distribution protocol using post selection, deriving results that are unconditionally secure in the sense of no longer restricting the eavesdroppers attack.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the process of sharing a key, simply a random string, between two parties by encoding the information in a quantum communications protocol. The power of this method is that the security of the key distribution, and the subsequent communication via a one-time pad, is established by imposing only physical limitations upon a potential eavesdropper making no assumptions about their technological capabilities.
There are two main families of QKD, discrete variable (DV) and continuous variable (CV) which are realised by encoding and then detecting single photons and the quadrature variables of the optical field respectively [1] . Initially it was thought that CV-QKD was insecure in principle for channel losses of greater than 50% but this problem has been circumvented by two different protocols, reverse reconciliation [2] and post-selection [3] which both, in principle, allow secure communication even for arbitrarily high losses.
Asymptotic (in the sense of string length) unconditional security is proved by first noting the equivalence of an experimentally implemented prepare and measure (P&M) scheme to an entanglement based (EB) version [4] , followed by the result that for collective attacks security may be bounded from below by assuming the entangled state at the end of the protocol is Gaussian [5] and finally using a proof that collective attacks are asymptotically optimal [6] . However, for protocols using post-selection (PS) this analysis cannot be straightforwardly applied as an equivalent entanglement based picture has yet to be constructed. To date security has only been shown under the assumption of a Gaussian eavesdropping attack [7] . Here, by filling in this gap we are able to provide a security proof applicable to all known post-selection protocols.
Entanglement based picture of post-selection
A conceptual flow chart of the proof method is shown in Fig.1 . In the equivalent entanglement based scheme we implement post-selection as a device that performs one of the projective measurements
U d p|p⟩⟨p| based upon a control determined by the qubit according to |0⟩ →x post-selection and |1⟩ →p post-selection. Measuring the qubit ensures that Alice will homodyne detect in the correct quadrature. After measuring she transmits the second mode to Bob over a quantum channel. Bob also employs the projective postselection measurement upon his mode just prior to detection. If both succeed the state is retained and used for key generation.
Using this method we are able to construct and equivalent entanglement based scheme that takes into account the effect of post-selection by Alice and Bob and thus apply Gaussian optimality arguments to bound the secret key rate of post-selection protocols without making any assumptions about the form of the eavesdroppers attack. Fig. 1 . Protocols considered in post-selection security proof. In the prepare and measure version (a) Alice transmits a non-Gaussian ensemble of coherent states to Bob who measures randomly switching between quadratures and subsequently post-selects his data. Equivalently (b) Alice mixes one arm of an EPR pair with vacuum on a 50:50 beamsplitter before passing it through a device that projects into a particular region of one quadrature. She transmits the other arm to Bob who also projectively filters prior to his detection. The quadrature the post-selected device projects into and that is subsequently homodyned is determined by the outcome of a measurement on a qubit in a |0⟩ + |1⟩ superposition. The two protocols are identical from the perspective of Eve and Bob and have exactly the same security. Finally a lower bound on the key rate is attained by analysing an unfiltered, hence completely Gaussian, EPR state (c) with the same first and second moments.
